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Abstract 
 
Making sense of intimate partner violence has long been seen through the lens of 
coercive control. However, despite the long-standing presence of this concept it is only 
in recent years that efforts have been made to recognise coercive control within the 
legal context. This article examines the extent to which the law per se has the power or 
indeed the capacity to respond to what is known about coercive control. To do so, it 
charts the varied ways in which coercive control has entered legal discourse in different 
jurisdictions and maps these efforts onto what is evidenced about the nature and extent 
of coercive control in everyday life. This article then places the legal and the everyday 
side by side and considers the unintended consequences of ‘coercive control creep’. In 
conclusion it is suggested that the criminalisation of coercive control only serves to fail 
those it is intended to protect. 
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The Criminalisation of Coercive Control: The Power of Law? 
 
Introduction 
Making sense of intimate partner violence (IPV) has long been seen through the lens of 
coercive control (Schechter, 1982; Johnson, 1995; Stark, 2007). Indeed, in a recent 
overview of research on this topic Hamberger et. al. (2017) identify 22 different ways of 
defining and operationalising coercive control, all of which generate findings with 
different emphases.  Nonetheless, their review of this work points to three features of 
coercive control on which there seems to be some agreement:   intentionality on the part 
of the abuser; the negative perception of the controlling behaviour on the part of the 
victim; and the abuser’s ability to obtain control by use of a credible threat. Taking 
these three features together, it is easy to see how Stark (2007:  13) understands 
coercive control as a ‘liberty crime’ and an endemic feature of wider gender inequalities 
experienced by women across the globe (see also Kelly and Westmarland, 2016; 
Manjoo, 2016; World Health Organisation (WHO), 2013). The concept itself certainly 
encourages a deeper appreciation of the hidden and intrusive consequences of 
“dimensions of partner abuse that have gone largely unnoticed and that are not normally 
associated with assault” (Stark 2007: 204), for example, psychological abuse, 
intimidation and isolation. Moreover, it is a concept designed to capture the long-term, 
ongoing nature of a wide range of forms of violence, not exclusively physical, that can 
pervade women’s (and some men’s) routine daily lives. However, despite the long-
standing presence of this way of thinking about men’s violence, it is only in recent years 
that efforts have been made to recognise coercive control within the legal context. The 
purpose of this article is to explore these efforts and to offer some reflections on the 
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extent to which the law per se has the power, or indeed the capacity, to respond to what 
is known about coercive control. 
 
This exploration falls into four parts. The first offers a brief overview of the 
varied ways in which coercive control has entered legal discourse in different 
jurisdictions. The second part maps these efforts onto what is evidenced about the 
nature and extent of coercive control in everyday life. In placing the legal and the 
everyday side by side, the third part of the article goes on to consider the extent to 
which the recourse to the law, understood as a feature of ‘coercive control creep’, 
carries with it unintended consequences, particularly for those it is intended to help. The 
final and concluding part considers the extent to which, in the light of the preceding 
discussion, the law can be an efficacious route to responding to the everyday nature of 
intimate partner violence(s. 
 
Coercive Control and the Criminal Law 
When considered through Stark’s frame of a “liberty crime”, it is easy to see how 
coercive control has become harnessed more recently within the criminal justice 
domain.  Nevertheless, as Williamson (2010) has pointed out, reframing domestic 
violence in this way poses challenges for all those working within this field for two 
reasons. Firstly, it focuses attention on the impact of a wider range of abusive 
behaviours (some criminalised, some not) on the victim. Secondly, it moves the focus of 
attention for criminal justice professionals away from responding to victims from an 
individual incident-led approach to a process-led approach concerned with addressing 
the cumulative effect of the minutiae of everyday behaviours. As Renzetti (1992) 
observed some time ago, finding the balance between autonomy and intimacy is a 
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challenge faced by all relationships; consequently, appreciating how and when that 
challenge becomes coercive and controlling is both important and difficult. 
Nevertheless, reframing IPV as a liberty crime has created the space for a range of 
different criminal law interventions. These potentialities range from its use as part of 
expert testimony in court proceedings to its use as a specific defence for action taken, 
particularly in cases of homicide, as a constituent element of specific offences, and as a 
specific criminal offence in its own right. It will be useful to say a little about each of 
these in turn, though it is the last of these interventions which has provoked the most 
reform activity and contemporary academic interest. 
 
Coercive control in court: the use of expert testimony in criminal cases 
Sheehy (2018) offers a detailed analysis of efforts in the case of Teresa Craig in 
Canada to invoke coercive control in support of making a case of self-defence in her 
trial for the murder of her partner. This is an interesting case in itself, since Evan Stark 
was brought to the court as an expert witness. Whilst his status as an expert witness was 
subjected to some considerable debate by the court, he was permitted to testify on 
Craig’s behalf. The court was clearly rather more familiar with psychiatrists and/or 
psychologists providing reports in respect of post-traumatic stress disorder and/or 
battered women’s syndrome as part of the defence in cases of this kind and evidence of 
coercive control was new ground. Sheehy (2018) documents the difficulties this strategy 
posed for the court and suggests that, without the broader criminalisation of coercive 
control, it is a strategy unlikely to prove successful in Canada.  
In a comparative analysis of two cases and their associated judgements in New 
Zealand (NZ),
i
 Midson (2016) also considers the possibilities of coercive control as a 
specific defence for murder. Using these two cases as illustrative, she explores the 
5 
 
question of culpability and responsibility and their relevance for such cases. She 
concludes by suggesting: 
 
When victims of coercive control kill their abusers there is no ‘‘malice 
aforethought’’ in the true sense of that phrase, despite the appearance of willed 
action. The act is not malicious or angry – it is a normative response to coercive 
conditions. On that basis, it is not just or fair to label these victims as 
‘‘murderers’’ or ‘‘killers’’, even though the criminal justice system might rightly 
hold them responsible to some degree. (Midson, 2016:1272) 
 
The tension between culpability and responsibility in cases which lack physical 
evidence (for example of injury or the use of tracking devices and so on) in support of a 
partial or complete defence to murder has recently been tested in England and Wales in 
the appeal case of Sally Challen. In February 2019, Challen successfully appealed her 
2011 conviction for the murder of her husband, with the Court of Appeal quashing her 
original conviction for murder. In what has been described by Women’s Aid UK (2019) 
as a ‘bittersweet victory’ for Challen, the court simultaneously ordered that Challen be 
retried for murder on the basis of new evidence that she was suffering from a mental 
disorder at the time of the killing.. In her original trial, Challen’s defence unsuccessfully 
raised a partial defence of diminished responsibility. While coercive control has not 
been introduced as a specific (partial or complete) defence to murder, it was introduced 
as a stand-alone criminal offence in England and Wales in 2015 (discussed more fully 
below), four years after Challen’s conviction, and much of the media coverage in the 
lead up to Challen’s appeal focused on the new legislation and the possibility that it 
would be pivotal in contextualising Challen’s actions to the court. The appeal judgment 
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however, suggests that the evidence of coercive control was less pivotal than expected, 
with Lady Justice Hallett stating: 
 
There might be those out there who think this appeal is all about coercive 
control but it’s not … Primarily, it’s about diagnosis of disorders that were 
undiagnosed at the time of the trial. (cited in Curtis, 2019) 
 
As such, this case, as yet, does little to demonstrate the ways in which evidence of 
coercive control can be used at trial and/or on appeal to allow the courts to better 
understand and respond to the circumstances within which women kill their prolonged 
domestic abusers. However understanding these circumstances has been valuable in 
challenging accepted interpretations of provocation as a partial defence for murder (as 
illustrated in the work of Fitz-Gibbon 2014) and the Challen case (still sub judice) may 
further an appreciation of these kinds of circumstances. 
 
Coercive control as an adjunct to already criminalized behaviours 
 Whilst using expert testimony to enable a jury to appreciate the particular 
circumstances which may result in murder takes different forms across different 
jurisdictions, in some countries consideration is being given to the role of coercive 
control as a specific feature and/or as an adjunct to behaviours already criminalized. For 
example, Ortiz (2018) notes that Tennessee, following the example of the law now on 
the statute books in England and Wales, adapts its law on false imprisonment to include 
a specific category of behaviours she defines as domestic false imprisonment. This, she 
argues, maintains compliance with the American Constitution on the need for legal 
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clarity, whilst at the same time capturing the essence of coercive control. Thus, 
domestic false imprisonment could be defined as: 
 
A course of conduct intentional, knowing, reckless, or negligent repeated or 
continuing harassment, intimidation, exploitation, humiliation, isolation, and/or 
control, directed toward a person with whom the perpetrator has a personal 
connection, which interferes substantially with that person's liberty and autonomy. 
(Ortiz, 2018: 707-9) 
 
In a similar vein, Stansfield and Williams (2018) provide evidence for understanding 
the presence of non-fatal strangulation in coercive control. In their US case data, they 
explore the relationship between the use of threats to kill and the delivery of such 
threats. They conclude that: 
 
The results consistently showed a robust empirical relation between 
perpetrators’ death threats and subsequent escalation into nonfatal strangulation 
as a way of maintaining control through fear and intimidation. (Stansfield & 
Williams, 2018:14) 
 
In highlighting this link, their work contributes to a debate making its presence felt 
globally concerning the introduction of specific offences for strangulation. Such 
offences exist in 47 jurisdictions in the United States (Theakston, 2019)), have been 
introduced in NZ (Family Violence (Amendments) Act 2018 s 189A, see further Law 
Commission, 2016), and have been introduced and/or debated in a number of Australian 
states and territories (Fitz-Gibbon et. al. 2018; Gotsis, 2018). The work of Stansfield 
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and Williams (2018) is clearly suggestive of a need to at least reframe understandings of 
such existing laws in terms of coercive control. This legal strategy focuses considerable 
attention on the role of practitioners in embracing such understandings (see also 
Brennan et. al. 2018). However, some jurisdictions have taken the concept of coercive 
control further and have introduced specific legislation designed to capture the wide 
range and ongoing nature of behaviours included within it. 
 
A specific offence of coercive control  
The introduction of new criminal law offences designed specifically to capture 
coercive and controlling behaviours is arguably where the translation of the clinical 
notion of coercive control into the legal realm has animated most debate. Over the last 
10 years, new offences have been introduced to varying degrees across the United 
Kingdom, Europe, and Australia (Douglas, 2015), and debated in the United States 
(Tuerkheimer, 2007). While these offences have taken varied forms – in terms of the 
label applied to the abusive behaviour they are designed to address and their inclusivity 
(for example, some are gender-specific and/or apply only to those in intimate partner 
relationships) – at the core of each has been an argument that a new category of 
criminal offence was necessary to capture a pattern of abusive behaviours the law was 
otherwise incapable of responding to. The operation of these new categories have, 
however, arguably raised more questions than answers in terms of the merits of, and 
need for, more law to improve justice system responses to IPV.   
Marking one of the earlier examples of this reform, in Australia, the Tasmanian 
Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) introduced two new offences: one of economic abuse 
and one of emotional abuse and intimidation. Both fit within the rubric of coercive 
control and indeed both are couched in terms of an ongoing course of conduct. Yet, to 
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date neither has resulted in many prosecutions. In a detailed examination of the 
operation of these offences, McMahon and McGorrery (2016) suggest a number of 
reasons for this, drawing attention to the flaws inherent in their formulation, rather than 
failure of take-up on the part of legal practitioners. In sum, their analysis suggests that 
these laws are limited by the fact that:  
 incidents need to be reported within 12  months of their occurrence;  
 the legislative drafting suffers from lack of clarity concerning 
understandings of reasonableness in relation to each of these behaviours; 
 there are difficulties in operationalising emotional abuse in the legal context; 
 there are overlaps between the offences in terms of what is 
included/excluded; and  
 there are overlaps between these offences and other offences on the statute 
books, arguably making both redundant.   
This analysis of these specific offences in a small Australian jurisdiction echoes some of 
the commentary to be found in relation to the offence of coercive and controlling 
behaviour introduced in England and Wales in December 2015, to which we now turn 
our attention.  
 Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act (England and Wales) 2015 states: 
 
A person (A) commits an offence [of coercive control] if—  
(a) A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards another person 
(B) 
that is controlling or coercive, 
(b) At the time of the behaviour, A and B are personally connected, 
(c) The behaviour has a serious effect on B, and 
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(d) A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect on 
B." 
 
For the purposes of the English legislation, coercive control is defined as behaviour:  
 
….which takes place “repeatedly or continuously”. The victim and alleged 
perpetrator must be “personally connected” at the time the behaviour takes 
place. The behaviour must have had a “serious effect” on the victim, meaning 
that it has caused the victim to fear violence will be used against them on “at 
least two occasions”, or it has had a “substantial adverse effect on the victims’ 
day to day activities”. The alleged perpetrator must have known that their 
behaviour would have a serious effect on the victim, or the behaviour must have 
been such that he or she “ought to have known” it would have that effect. (Home 
Office, 2015: 2) 
 
While limited to persons in a current intimate relationship and/or who live together, this 
offence covers a wide range of behaviours (Home Office, 2015) and explicitly draws on 
the work of Stark (2007), with the key exception that the offence is defined in gender-
neutral terms. This is a significant departure from Stark’s (2007) conceptualisation of 
coercive control and stands in contrast to the Scottish legislation introduced in 2018, 
which recognises the gendered pattern of domestic abuse and also includes ex-partners 
within its remit (Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018; see further Burman and Brooks-
Hay, 2018; Stark and Hester, 2019).  In terms of take-up by the criminal justice system, 
there were just over 9000 offences of coercive control recorded by the police in England 
and Wales in the year ending March 2018, out of a total of just over 2 million incidents 
11 
 
of domestic abuse recorded for that year (Office of National Statistics, 2018).  These 
figures represent a doubling of the coercive control offences recorded for 2017, clearly 
indicative of this new legislation gaining a foothold with practitioners. However, as the 
data reported by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ, 2017) illustrate, the take 
up has been patchy, the data suggesting varied levels of implementation in different 
police forces.  
Early evaluations of the English legislation point to problems for front-line 
police officers in ‘seeing’ coercive control (Wiener, 2017); in practitioner 
understandings of coercive control more generally (Robinson et al, 2018; Brennan et. al 
2018); and problems associated with evidencing this offence (Bishop and Bettinson, 
2018). However, despite mixed evaluations of its early operation, like offences have 
continued to emerge in nearby jurisdictions, including the aforementioned Scottish 
offence and, most recently, the introduction of a new offence of coercive control in 
Ireland, under section 39 of the Domestic Violence Act).   
Many of the problems highlighted above are not new to the field of domestic 
abuse; in many ways, despite its symbolic power, the law itself is a blunt instrument in 
affording change to the wider social practices of violence rooted in gender inequality 
(see further Goodmark, 2018; Fitz-Gibbon et al 2017). Tolmie (2018) offers a 
substantial summary of the arguments both for and against using the law in this way, 
with Douglas (2018) adding the potential for criminal justice systems abuse to the list of 
abuses women already experience in their relationship with the law. Walklate et. al. 
(2018) offer a more detailed analysis of the specific problems associated with this 
particular offence, while Burman and Brooks-Hay (2018: 78) conclude their analysis of 
the prospective Scottish legislation by stating: 
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Decades of policy and legislative reform of the criminal justice response to other 
forms of violence against women leave us somewhat pessimistic that the 
introduction of this new offence within Scotland’s adversarial context, which 
sustains forms of legal practice known to effectively undermine the spirit of any 
well-intentioned legislation, will fully achieve its bold ambitions … Legislative 
change cannot on its own lead to improvements. Whatever laws we have will be 
only as effective as those who enforce, prosecute and apply them. Improving 
these practices –through education, training and embedding best practice and 
domestic abuse expertise – is likely to be more effective than the creation of new 
offences alone. 
 
Of course, here Burman and Brooks-Hay (2018) are articulating a long-standing 
dilemma within this field concerning the extent to which the recourse to law can make a 
difference on this issue (see also Goodmark, 2018). This recourse to law fails to 
recognise the law itself as coercive and controlling (Douglas, 2018), the problems of 
operationalising coercion as it already exists within legal discourse (Brunk, 1979) and 
the associated problems of (in)voluntariness (Kuennan, 2014). All of these issues are 
returned to below; however, at this juncture it is of value to note that the early 
evaluations of this specific legal intervention, alongside the other strategies listed above, 
more often than not replicate the commonalities found amongst definitions of coercive 
control identified by Hamberger et. al. (2017) now reappearing as problems of policy 
implementation. Thus, taken together, these issues unveil the potential of 
(mis)recognition of coercive control for perpetrators, victims and practitioners alike, 
perhaps leading to the fundamental question asked by Crossman and Hardesty (2018: 
196): ‘what makes control coercive?’ It is to this question this article turns next. 
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Coercive Control in Everyday Life 
It is without doubt that coercive control operates in a myriad of ways in women’s (and 
some men’s) everyday lives. Variously envisaged as a cage (Stark, 2007) or as a web, 
tree, or trap (Pitman, 2017), its effects can be experienced cognitively, emotionally, and 
socially, frequently resulting in its victims being isolated, with little sense of self-worth 
and/or self-esteem. Most often conceptualised in terms of the everyday effects of wider 
patriarchal social relationships, the presence of coercive control and its value as a 
concept has been recently demonstrated in the use of digital media as a means of control 
(see for example, Douglas et. al. 2019; Harris and Woodlock, 2019), has been 
evidenced in directing practices of ‘good’ mothering (Radford and Hester, 2006; 
Heward-Belle, 2017); has been used as a tool in making sense of ‘custody stalking’ 
(Elizabeth, 2017); and is well-recognised as a non-violent mechanism of control (Stark, 
2007; Crossman et al. 2016). The presence of coercive control in intimate partner 
relationships specifically has been shown to have an impact on children as physical 
forms of violence
ii
 (Callaghan et al. 2018; McLeod, 2018), and is no respecter of age, 
ethnicity, ability or culture. However, despite its pervasive nature, the questions of 
intent on the part of the perpetrator and the negative perception and the credibility of the 
associated threats on the part of the victim remain central features of any potential 
impact this range of abusive behaviours might have. So, when does control become 
coercive or, as Kuennan (2014) might say, when is enough, enough? 
In a recent empirical excavation of this question, Crossman and Hardesty (2018) 
draw the distinction between women’s experiences of constraint through commitment 
and constraint through force. Their (retrospective) data from interviews undertaken with 
22 divorced women identified control as a feature of all these women’s relationships. 
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However, this manifested itself in two different ways. For some women in their sample, 
control/constraint was felt and experienced as part of the compromises made through 
their commitment to their relationship, which might have also involved making 
sacrifices in the interests of their marriage and/or children. Many of these experiences 
could be seen to be associated with the kind of social norms/expectations permeating 
their lives. In contrast, for those women who experienced constraint through force, the 
emphasis was different, even though the compromises and behaviours may have been 
the same. For these women, the men in their lives used social norms/expectations to 
constrain them. Interestingly, the use of physical violence against them featured for 
women in both of these groups, but the variations in control they experienced were not 
contingent upon the violence itself. These findings, Crossman and Hardesty (2015) 
suggest, support the notion of entrapment being used by some men to control their 
partners and lend support to the view that it is not the behaviours per se that are 
problematic, but the frequency with which they are used.   
This study clearly lends support to the presence of coercive control in 
relationships, but adds a more nuanced understanding to its manifestation in recognising 
how control might be experienced as part of either a positive commitment to working in 
a relationship or as entrapment. Recognising the difference between these circumstances 
then becomes a critical issue for practitioner and legal responses. Importantly these 
findings, which resonate with the issue of the relationship between autonomy and 
intimacy raised by Renzetti (1992) some time ago, imply that control is not always 
coercive. Moreover, when applied in the context of criminal justice responses, they also 
pose the inherently tricky question: when does a ‘normal’ intimate partner relationship 
become criminal? (On the blurriness between coercive control, romance and intimate 
partner relationships, see for example Chung, 2005). So whilst coercive control has 
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been, and is, an enlightening descriptive tool for a range of behaviours, how – and under 
what conditions – an appreciation of relationship processes are appropriate for criminal 
justice intervention remains a moot point. The difficulty of identifying coercive and 
controlling behaviours as criminal is well captured by Bishop (2016: 2) who explains: 
 
it’s difficult to objectively assess whether coercive control has taken place. The 
abuser will typically use signals and covert messages to exert and maintain 
control and often these have meaning only in the context of that particular 
relationship. For example, the perpetrator may use a specific look, phrase or 
movement to convey to the victim that they are close to breaking an unspoken 
“rule”. But these signals may be hard to classify as abusive in and of themselves. 
Compliance with demands about dressing, shopping or cooking in a particular 
way to avoid repercussions may seem voluntary to an outsider with little or no 
understanding of the dynamics in the relationship. 
In some ways, this alludes to the well-recognised tension between the ‘isolated’ 
incident-led focus of criminal justice responses and the process of responding to a series 
of inter-related experiences that the concept of coercive control endeavours to convey. 
This tension is not easy to address, since recognition of it belies further underlying 
difficulties with what might be called ‘coercive control creep’.  
 
Coercive Control Creep and its Unintended Consequences 
Efforts to respond to violence against women have spiralled up criminal justice policy 
agendas across the globe since the mid-1980s. The dominance of North American 
voices in shaping those policy agendas has been well documented by Goodmark (2015). 
By the same token, those same policies have come under increasing scrutiny regarding 
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their efficacy, with researchers noting that the mere introduction and ‘travelling’ nature 
of such policies should not be misinterpreted as evidence of their effectiveness in 
practice (Goodmark, 2015; Walklate and Fitz-Gibbon, 2018). In some ways, coercive 
control creep emulates this policy process. Throughout this process, little thought has 
apparently been given to alternatives to criminalization and Goodmark (2017) outlines 
some of the possible reasons for this. At the same time, there has been sufficient 
evidence pointing to the unintended consequences of harnessing the law in this way, 
particularly for those who it is believed might be protected by the law (see, for example, 
Douglas 2018; Tolmie, 2018), with protection from the law being additionally 
problematic for Indigenous women (Blagg 2016); women with disabilities (Thiara et. al 
2011); and those from ethnic minorities (Gill and Harrison 2017) This evidence is 
multi-faceted and multi-layered, ranging from the specific consequences associated with 
particular legal strategies to the more general question of what it is that women (in 
violent relationships) might want from a criminal justice response and what they might 
receive in reality. The criminalisation of coercive control has drawn comment along all 
of these dimensions. 
The creation of any new offence in this field places women squarely within the 
domain of criminal justice. Yet the difficulties faced by women in dealing with criminal 
justice systems are both well-known and profound. As Hanna (2009) has commented, 
the more the criminal law tries to intervene on behalf of women, the more challenges it 
poses for them. From the point of contact with a front-line police officer, to presenting 
evidence at court, to dispositions by the court, whether that is criminal or civil, all 
present a range of hurdles for women to negotiate. The nature of these experiences can 
be contingent on a wide range of variables, including class, ethnicity and cultural 
background. However, a major contributing factor is fear: fear of their partner, fear of 
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the system and fear of what they might lose by exposing themselves to the criminal 
justice process (for example, their role as mothers to their children). These concerns 
have been consistently present, decades of policy activity notwithstanding. Responding 
to these concerns is not solely about training (criminal justice) professionals to respond 
more appropriately to women living with violence, though it is without doubt that more 
could be done in this respect. In particular, the creation of a new offence does not deal 
with any of the well-documented concerns women have for not engaging with the 
criminal justice process and, as Douglas (2018), has observed may also create new 
opportunities for what she has termed ‘legal systems abuse’: perpetrators using the legal 
system as a further way of asserting control over their partners (see, for example, 
research on protection orders and the criminalisation of women victims: Douglas and 
Fitzgerald, 2018; Douglas and Nancarrow, 2014). Additionally, such abuse can also 
contribute to the criminalisation of women, adding to their concerns about engagement 
with legal processes at all (see further Tolmie, 2018).  
The concerns consistently expressed by women also touch upon questions of 
what it is that they want from any intervention, legal or otherwise (as opposed to what 
activists might want or what policy-makers and practitioners might be charged with 
delivering). Classic understandings of women living with violence point to evidence 
that, if it is the woman herself who has asked for help or support, more often than not 
she just wants the behaviour of her partner, both violent and non-violent in all of its 
intimidating and fear-inducing manifestations, to stop (see inter alia Kirkwood 1993). 
Sometimes, for some women, love still matters (Kuennen, 2014). So, wanting 
undesirable behaviour to stop does not necessarily equate with wanting a partner’s 
behaviour to be subjected to criminal sanction. Clearly for some behaviours, particularly 
those of physical violence, a woman’s wishes in this respect can quite legitimately, in 
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terms of the law, be ignored. Even in cases where women do seek legal intervention and 
a punitive criminal justice system outcome, the criminalisation of coercive control in 
and of itself does little to address the long-held barriers women victims of IPV have 
faced in accessing justice (on this, see further Walklate et. al., 2018). To this end, 
introducing coercive control as a stand-alone offence presumes that women will have 
access to police, that police will have access to the required evidence, and the legal 
frameworks of the inherently masculine criminal court system will be open to their 
experiences of a pattern of abuse. When considered from that vantage, it is a lot to 
expect from a single piece of legislative law reform.     
Consequently, when women’s everyday experiences of control in their 
relationships (not all of which will be seen by them as coercive) are put alongside what 
they might want from any intervention, there is no necessary neatness of fit. Indeed, 
neither is there a neatness of fit with the policy responses claiming to meet their 
interests. Two issues arise as a consequence of this. The first is concerned with the 
relationship between individual autonomy and/or agency and the ongoing concern to 
criminalise coercive control. The second is concerned with the ways in which coercive 
control in and of itself has the capacity to downplay violence in relationships which 
arguably is the very issue a legal response is better equipped to deal with. Each of these 
will be discussed in turn. 
Kuennen (2014) discusses coercive control and the efforts to embrace this 
concept in criminal justice as the legal erasure of agency. This observation is similar to 
that made by Brunk (1979) some time ago in his discussion of the legal dilemma posed 
by the concept of coercion per se and what this implies for individual choice, or as 
Kuennen (2014) might say, agency. Perhaps put more squarely in terms of the evidence 
referred to in the discussion here, the question arises as to what this legal erasure 
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implies for women who choose to live with constraint, whether that be through 
commitment (Crossman and Hardesty, 2018) or as a result of any other motivation. This 
raises a further question concerning what a normal relationship might look like and who 
decides on such normality. The criminal law proves a blunt instrument for drawing such 
distinctions; as Hanna (2009: 1468) has argued, it ‘forces the question of coercion into a 
yes or no answer. The line between free choice and coercion gets drawn somewhere – 
and you are either coercive or not’ (see also Walklate et al. 2018: 119). Problematically, 
when these distinctions are drawn in the realm of law, it is not the individual 
experiencing the behaviour who decides whether the actions constitute coercive control 
and/or which actions should be considered criminal, but rather the legal actors involved. 
The erasure of agency in this way carries implications, of course, not just for women in 
cases of coercive control, but for all women, particularly as legal discourses can be, and 
are, used for purposes other than they were intended (Smart, 1989). The potential 
slippage from individual women to all women highlights the slipperiness of coercive 
control as a concept (Hamberger et. al. 2017) and, as a result of its lack of specificity, 
particularly in law, carries with it significant unintended consequences for its use in law. 
Ultimately, of course, the law itself must also be recognised as a site of coercion, 
alongside a range of other sources of sanction that coerce individuals to do things 
because they are afraid or intimidated to do otherwise. Brauer et. al. (2017) make the 
distinction between erratic and oppressive coercion in endeavouring to understand 
coercion as a feature of all aspects of offending behaviour and its consequences. For the 
purposes of this discussion, however, it is sufficient to note that the proponents of 
coercive control view its presence in women’s lives as though this were separate and 
separable from their experiences of coercion in other aspects of their lives and/or as a 
constituent feature of the human condition for everyone. 
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The second issue to be addressed here, the erasure of physical violence, has been 
discussed at length by Walby and Towers (2018). Their concern with downplaying 
physical violence and its importance for intimate partner relationships is as much 
methodological as it is conceptual, although these two concerns are connected. The 
absence of conceptual clarity impedes efforts to measure and for Walby and Towers 
(2018), any agenda focused on violence against women demands accurate measures, 
since it is these measurements and the counting of violence that ultimately persuade 
governments to take action across a wide range of domains, including but not limited to 
the legal context. However, the policing preoccupation with the presence of physical 
violence, for example, as a means of informing their decision-making in relation to 
violence against women is well-documented (see for example Robinson et al. 2016). 
Physical violence can more often than not be evidenced and can result in the kind of 
criminalisation pursued by those wanting to criminalise coercive control. Thus, there is 
a conundrum here in the way in which coercive control as a concept downplays the 
physically violent aspect of women’s lives that can be responded to more or less 
effectively by the incident-led response of the law, whilst simultaneously placing 
demands on criminal justice systems that, as yet, they are ill equipped to deal with. In 
this respect, a concern emerges which begs the question of whether, in seeking to 
criminalise a wider range of abusive behaviours, the day-to-day operation of an offence 
of coercive control may also serve to hide acts of physical violence. This kind of hiding 
has far reaching implications in terms of assessments of perpetrator risk, victim safety 
management and seriousness of criminal justice system intervention.  
 
Conclusion: coercive control, meaning and consequences 
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There are a number of themes running through this paper, some of which contribute to a 
bigger question and debate recently posed by Goodmark (2018) on decriminalising 
domestic violence. The coercive control creep documented here stands as testimony to 
some aspects of that bigger question. In particular, the criminalisation of coercive 
control may fail women in two respects. Firstly, it arguably fails at the level of the 
conceptual, in misunderstanding the coercive nature of the law and the inability to 
appreciate how this concept contributes to that process in erasing women’s agency. 
Secondly, it fails at the level of the experiential, in failing to see women’s lives in the 
round, particularly their reluctances to engage with criminal justice. Put simply, 
coercive control fails to ‘see’ responses to violence against women holistically and, in 
so doing, leaves the subject of law untouched (Naffine, 2003).  
 Some time ago, Naffine (1990) observed that the subject of law was the rational, 
middle-class entrepreneurial male. Law was made and practised with this subject in 
mind. This subject renders all those who fall outside of its parameters ‘other’, in both 
their experiences of the law and the likelihood that the law can ‘see’ or ‘hear’ them 
(Hudson, 2006; Easteal et. al 2018). In her later essay, Naffine (2003) sees little to be 
optimistic about in relation to the hold this subject of law has on law’s formulation and 
practice. However, following Smart (1989) and, more recently, Howe et al. (2019), this 
does not necessarily mean that law is not a site for action. It is. However, the law itself 
will never be enough and this truism has abounded in this field since the presence of 
second-wave feminism was felt (see, for example, Wilson, 1983). Coercive control is a 
constituent element in framing our understandings of the pervasive impact of a wide 
range of behaviours on women’s lives, but the law and its inherent structure of power is 
a very blunt instrument to address the concerns it brings to the fore. In this respect, 
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more law is definitely not the answer and only furthers the exclusion of those already 
excluded from criminal justice. 
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